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ABSTRACT
Blockchain or Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) introduces a new computing paradigm that is viewed by experts as a disruptive and revolutionary technology. While bitcoin is the most well-known successful application of blockchain technology, many other applications and sectors could successfully utilize the power of
blockchain. The potential applications of blockchain beyond finance and banking encouraged many organizations to integrate and adopt blockchain into existing or new
software systems. Integrating and using any new computing paradigm is expected to
affect the best practice and design principles of building software systems. Emerging blockchain-based applications require careful attention to many functional and
nonfunctional requirements. One common practice in software engineering to handle
potential pitfalls in software systems is using design patterns. Design patterns have
been long used in software development to optimize the quality of software being
developed. This research aims to determine the level of adoption of design patterns
blockchain applications and their usefulness by analyzing the quality of the source
code. This is achieved in a two-step process. Firstly, the quality of publicly available
blockchain-based applications developed with design patterns is compared with applications without design patterns. In the next step, two versions of a blockchain-based
application for cheque clearance are developed, with and without design patterns,
and their quality and vulnerability to attacks are compared.

IV

DEDICATION
I would like to dedicate this thesis to my parents and my sister for never giving up
their belief in my abilities despite me not deserving it. This work is the culmination of
their support throughout my academic journey and I hope I can make them proud.

V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to sincerely express my most profound gratitude towards my supervisor Dr. Sherif Saad Ahmed, who helped shape my graduate school experience. With
his mentorship, I was able to improve the quality of my research and my prowess as
a student of computer science.
Without the support provided by Scotiabank, this research project would have
never reached its goal. I would also like to thank the Cross-Border Institute of the
University of Windsor for all their support.
I would like to express my gratitude to my thesis committee members for their
beneficial advices and suggestions for my thesis.
I humbly extend my thanks to the School of Computer Science and all concerned
people who helped me in this regard.

VI

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

III

ABSTRACT

IV

DEDICATION

V

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

VI

LIST OF TABLES

X

LIST OF FIGURES

XI

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
1

2

Introduction
1.1 Blockchains . . . . .
1.2 Motivation . . . . . .
1.3 Problem Statement .
1.4 Thesis Contribution .
1.5 Thesis Organization .

XIII

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

1
1
1
2
2
3

Blockchains
2.1 Cryptocurrencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Taxonomy of Blockchains . . . . . . . . . .
2.3 Blockchain Architecture . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Transactions . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 Genesis Block . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4 Consensus Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.1 Proof-of-Work . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.2 Proof-of-Stake . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.4.3 Proof-of-Authority . . . . . . . . .
2.5 Blockchain Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.1 Bitcoin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.2 Ethereum . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.5.3 Hyperledger . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6 Blockchain Security . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.1 51% attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.2 Double Spending . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.3 Malicious Forking . . . . . . . . . .
2.6.4 Exchange Hacks and DDoS Attacks
2.6.5 Social Engineering . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

5
5
6
7
7
9
12
12
13
16
17
17
17
18
20
21
21
21
22
22
22

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

VII

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

3

4

5

6

Blockchain-based Applications
3.1 Blockchain-based Applications . . . . .
3.2 Smart Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.1 Solidity . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2.2 Lifecycle of a Smart Contract .
3.3 DApps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4 Smart Contract Vulnerabilities . . . . .
3.4.1 Re-entrancy . . . . . . . . . . .
3.4.2 Integer Underflow and Overflow
3.4.3 Overlap Attack . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Design Patterns for Smart Contracts .

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Related Works
4.1 Software Engineering Practices for Blockchain-based Applications
4.1.1 Gathering Business Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.2 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.3 Implementation and Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1.4 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Smart Contract Design patterns for various scenarios . . . . . . .
4.3 Software Quality Metrics in Solidity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Methodology
5.0.1 Blockchain Platform Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Step 1: Analyze existing DApp Smart Contracts . . . . . . . . .
5.1.1 Etherscan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.2 Gas Consumption and Lines of Code . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.3 Static Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1.4 Design pattern detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Analysis of custom blockchain-based application: ChequeChain .
5.2.1 General Operational Scenario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2 Technical description of Architecture . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2.1 Banking Website Renderer . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2.2 Banking Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2.3 Banking API/WebService . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.2.4 Ethereum Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.3 Network Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.4 Smart Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2.5 Design Patterns to be used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Experiments and Results
6.1 Analyzing existing DApp Contracts
6.1.1 Dataset . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1.2 Pattern Detection . . . . . .
6.1.3 Gas Used and Lines of Code
6.1.4 Slither . . . . . . . . . . . .
VIII

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

23
23
24
24
26
26
28
28
29
30
30

.
.
.
.
.
.
.

32
32
33
34
36
36
38
47

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

49
49
50
51
51
52
53
54
55
58
58
59
59
59
60
61
64

.
.
.
.
.

66
66
66
67
69
70

6.1.5 Smartcheck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1.6 Securify . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Analysis of ChequeChain contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

72
75
77

Conclusion and Future Work
7.1 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81
82

6.2
7

REFERENCES

83

VITA AUCTORIS

89

IX

LIST OF TABLES
4.1.1

General Business Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

5.1.1

Gas Costs in Ethereum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

6.2.1

ChequeChain Slither Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78

6.2.2

ChequeChain Smartcheck Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

6.2.3

ChequeChain Securify Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

X

LIST OF FIGURES
2.3.1

Blockchain Network Diagram (Public vs Private) [24] . . . . . . . . .

7

2.3.2

Bitcoin transaction details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

2.3.3

Blocks in a blockchain [24] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

2.3.4

Merkle Tree [28] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11

2.3.5

Ethereum Genesis Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.4.1

Proof of Work [53] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2.4.2

GPU Mining Farm [8] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.4.3

ASIC Mining Farm [53] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

15

2.4.4

Proof-of-Stake [53] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

2.5.1

Bitcoin Genesis Block [35] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.5.2

Ethereum Genesis Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.2.1

Simple Solidity contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

3.3.1

Traditional Application vs DApp [42] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

3.3.2

Metamask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27

3.4.1

Re-entrancy Attack [10] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

3.4.2

Integer Underflow/Overflow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

5.1.1

Etherscan Verified Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

5.2.1

Chequechain Success Flow

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

5.2.2

Single Chequechain Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

5.2.3

ChequeChain network with one bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

5.2.4

ChequeChain network with three banks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

6.1.1

Number of contracts implementing a certain design pattern . . . . .

68

6.1.2

Number of patterns per contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

6.1.3

Gas Used per Line of code, with or without patterns . . . . . . . . .

70

6.1.4

Slither Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

71

6.1.5

Slither: Number of insecure contracts, with or without patterns . . .

71

XI

6.1.6

Slither: Number of insecure contracts vs number of patterns . . . . .

72

6.1.7

Smartcheck: Analysis of an input contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

73

6.1.8

Smartcheck: Number of insecure contracts, with or without patterns

74

6.1.9

Smartcheck: Number of insecure contracts vs number of patterns . .

75

6.1.10 Securify: Analysis of an input contract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

76

6.1.11 Securify: Number of insecure contracts, with or without patterns . .

76

6.1.12 Securify: Number of insecure contracts vs number of patterns . . . .

77

XII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BTC

Bitcoin (cryptocurrency)

ETH

Ether (cryptocurrency)

UTC

Coordinated Universal Time

ICO

Initial Coin Offering

PoW

Proof-of-Work

PoS

Proof-of-Stake

PoA

Proof-of-Authority

GPU

Graphics Processing Unit

ASIC

Application Specific Integrated Circuit

EVM

Ethereum Virtual Machine

ABI

Application Binary Interface

XIII

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1

Blockchains

A blockchain is a decentralized network where each node contains a synchronized
copy of a ledger that records transactions between members of the network. It was
first introduced in 2008 [31] as a means to implement a decentralized digital currency
called Bitcoin. Blockchains can be used to handle transactions between parties that
do not trust each other. Therefore, they are also referred to as trustless networks.
Blockchains have become extremely popular in recent years mostly due to the hype
behind Bitcoin. However, industry leaders across various domains such as healthcare,
finance, supply chain management etc., have realized the potential of blockchains beyond cryptocurrency. By using blockchains to replace existing systems that required
central authorities and middlemen, they have managed to decentralize and accelerate
time-critical processes with great success [2].

1.2

Motivation

While rapid innovation and development of blockchain technologies and frameworks
have led to disruption in different domains, it is important to determine if the software
being used to achieve this innovation is of high quality. This is due to immutability:
a feature of blockchains that can lead to disastrous consequences if poor quality
software is used for business-critical processes. This also requires a unique set of
software engineering practices, tailored to suit the immutable nature of blockchains

1
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and adaptable to the ever-changing blockchain landscape.

1.3

Problem Statement

Recently, there have been a lot of developments in the field of blockchain software
engineering, especially with the creation and adoption of software design patterns. It
is important to determine if the aforementioned software engineering practices and
design patterns currently used in blockchain-based application development have an
impact on the quality and security of the applications developed. To investigate the
impact of design patterns on software quality, we propose a two-step methodology that
involves an analysis of design patterns and whether their utilization helps improve
code quality and reduce security vulnerabilities.
Our main objective here is to provide a view of how usage of design patterns
for development of smart contracts in blockchain-based applications can help prevent
vulnerabilities that can lead to disastrous consequences. Performing this analysis
on source code available live on public blockchains, as well as on a custom built
blockchain-based application will provide concrete results that prove whether design
patterns are useful from a security perspective.

1.4

Thesis Contribution

In summary, we make the following contributions:
• We conducted a detailed study of the software development lifecycle and design patterns in blockchain-based applications. We studied how the previous researches have created design patterns for specific scenarios unique to blockchain
technology. We also provided a survey of code quality metrics, vulnerabilities,
and static analysis tools for blockchain-based applications.
• We provide an empirical analysis of design patterns currently used in blockchainbased application development by measuring the presence of exploitable vulnerabilities in smart contracts available publicly, using static analysis methods.
2
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• Since there are no smart contract design pattern detection tools available currently, we built a custom detection tool based on our understanding of implementation of design patterns. This tool was used to detect design patterns in
publicly available smart contracts.
• Furthermore, we developed our own blockchain-based application for use in
the banking sector. We present this application as a case study where we
develop smart contracts based on specific business requirements and measure the
presence of vulnerabilities in smart contracts without applying design patterns
to them and then applying design patterns for the same use case and performing
static analysis again.

1.5

Thesis Organization

The rest of the thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we provide an indepth introduction to blockchain technology, its
underlying principles, how blockchain networks are built, consensus algorithms,
popular blockchain platforms and security issues in blockchains.
• In Chapter 3, we approach blockchains from a software engineering perspective
with a basic introduction to Smart Contracts, DApps, and differences between
blockchain-based applications and traditional web applications.
• In Chapter 4, we present a survey of existing literature related to our problem
statement. This literature survey is divided into three categories and papers
related to each of the concepts are summarized
• In Chapter 5, we show the design and implementation of our two-step approach
to test the impact of design patterns on code quality in blockchain-based applications. The considerations for choosing a suitable blockchain platform for our
approach is discussed, and an indepth explanation of the architectural setup for
both steps is provided.
3
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• In Chapter 6, experiments and results of our two-step approach is provided.
• Finally, in Chapter 7, we conclude the thesis and discuss the potential future
work

4

CHAPTER 2
Blockchains
In this chapter, we start by describing what blockchains are, how they can be classified, their architecture, and what the various blockchain platforms used today are
and the differences between them.

2.1

Cryptocurrencies

Before discussing blockchain technology in-depth, it is important to address the concept of cryptocurrencies, which form the core reason behind a blockchain’s functionality as well as its popularity. A cryptocurrency is a decentralized digital currency
that can be sent to or received from a member on the blockchain network. Here, it
is important to note that there is no direct transfer of assets or data that takes place
between the members. Rather, the blockchain software keeps track of the amount
of cryptocurrency held by the members of the network, and increases/decreases the
amount when it recognizes and acknowledges that a transaction has occurred. This
is why blockchains are referred to as distributed ledgers.
Cryptocurrencies have a monetary value based on real life assets associated with
them, such as the US Dollar. Cryptocurrencies quickly became popular among tech
enthusiasts due to its promise of zero governance, complete decentralization of information, and transparency while maintaining anonymity. Cryptocurrencies are a
finite resource and the extraction of this resource depends on being a participating
member of the network. Since the supply is depleted as more people join the network,
the value of the smallest unit of a cryptocurrency will keep increasing. This leads to

5
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more people joining the network and the value of the cryptocurrency will compound
exponentially.
The popularity of the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin, has led to several other implementations of cryptocurrencies. There are currently over 5000 other cryptocurrencies,
or AltCoins available worldwide [36].
New cryptocurrencies are launched using a system called Initial Coin Offerings.
When a company wants to launch its own blockchain platform or a cryptocurrency,
it publishes a whitepaper and a website to provide information about its services to
people who are involved in blockchain technology as well as people who have no idea
what blockchains are. People who are interested in the objective presented by the
company can send them an existing cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin or Ether, or real
world currency, in exchange for a certain amount of the new cryptocurrency with the
promise that value of the new crypto they received will increase as more people join
the network and buy the currency.

2.2

Taxonomy of Blockchains

Blockchain networks can be classified into two types based on who can become a
participating node in the network.
• Public Blockchains: As the name suggests, anyone can become a member of
a public blockchain network, download the contents, become an active node,
and participate in the network. Most cryptocurrencies are implemented using
public blockchains. All users on a public blockchain are completely anonymous.
Popular public blockchain networks such as Bitcoin and Ethereum Mainnet have
thousands of nodes spread out across the world according to Bitnodes, a service
that tracks active Bitcoin nodes.
• Private Blockchains: In a private blockchain, only a predetermined set of
members can act as participation nodes that can read and add data to the
blockchain. These members are known to each other. As the name suggests,
6
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these blockchains are not open to the public. Ethereum and Hyperledger provide
platforms to build private blockchains. (Refer Section 2.5.3).
• Permissioned Blockchains: Permissioned blockchains are a hybrid of public
and private blockchains. In this type of blockchain, anybody is allowed to join
the blockchain, but they have to declare their identity to other members on
the network. Hyperledger provides Burrow, a platform to build a permissioned
blockchain. Another example of a permissioned blockchain is Ripple.

2.3

Blockchain Architecture

A blockchain network consists of interconnected nodes that communicate using peerto-peer technology. A node refers to a computer that is running the blockchain
software which includes a copy of the current state of the data on the blockchain,
tools and functions that allow the computer to add and read data, and the networking
protocol that allows it communicate with other nodes on the network. [54]

Fig. 2.3.1: Blockchain Network Diagram (Public vs Private) [24]

2.3.1

Transactions

Operations that take place between different parties on a blockchain are referred to
as transactions. A transaction is a transfer of any amount of the cryptocurrency that

7

2. BLOCKCHAINS

the blockchain network keeps track of, between the users of the blockchain. These
transactions can be performed using web applications that allow users to store their
digital identity and details about the amount of cryptocurrency they own, in the form
of a wallet. The digital identity of a user consists of a public key that acts as the
unique identity of the user on the blockchain network, and a private key that the user
can use to sign a transaction as their own using asymmetric encryption.
Details of a sample transaction on the Bitcoin network are shown in Fig. 2.3.2.
Transaction and block information on public blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum
Mainnet are available for anybody to read. Information about this particular transaction can be accessed at this location.

Fig. 2.3.2: Bitcoin transaction details

When a transaction occurs, the corresponding record is not immediately stored in
a block on the blockchain. Rather it is stored in a temporary data structure called a
transaction pool, which is shared with every node on the network.
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2.3.2

Blocks

Each node in the blockchain uses its blockchain software to retrieve a set of transactions from the pool simultaneously and decides whether the transactions it retrieved
should be included in the next block. Once the node decides the set of transactions,
it competes with other nodes on the network to determine which node gets to add a
block and modify the state of the blockchain. This process is referred to as a consensus algorithm (Refer section 2.4) [53]. The node that gets chosen to modify the
state is referred to as the leader node and it adds the block to its own copy of the
blockchain and also shares the block with all the other nodes for synchronization.
The transaction is complete only when the new block is added by each and every
node in the network to its respective copy. The leader node also receives a financial
reward in the form of cryptocurrency for successfully utilizing its resources to update
the state of the blockchain.
Each block in a blockchain contains the following data:
• Block header
– Timestamp of the time at which the block was mined
– Blockchain version number
– Details related to the consensus algorithm of the blockchain
– Merkle Root
– Previous block hash
• Block body
– List of transactions
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Fig. 2.3.3: Blocks in a blockchain [24]

In the block header, the blockchain version number helps identify the primary
sequence of blocks that needs to be appended. Different blockchain protocols use
different algorithms to determine this primary sequence.
Blockchains are heavily reliant on cryptographic hashing algorithms. These algorithms, otherwise known as hash functions, provide a unique string representation
of the given input data[14]. The input data can be of any format and of any size,
but the output will always be a fixed length string. Even the smallest change to the
input generates a drastically different output string. Therefore, these hash functions
are applied to the transaction data that is retrieved when a block is to be mined, to
generate a unique representation of the block. Bitcoin uses SHA-256, Ethereum uses
SHA-3 (Keccak-256), and Hyperledger uses SHA-2 algorithms [12].
The Merkle Root value in the block header is the root of the Merkle Tree structure
for this particular block. This structure is used to determine the unique hash of this
block but is computationally less intensive than hashing the block data as a whole.
The leaf nodes of the Merkle Tree represent hash values of individual transactions.
The hash of the concatenation of the values in two sibling leaf nodes becomes the
parent node in the tree. This process is again repeated for the hash values in the
parent node and in an uncle node over and over again until the Merkle Root is
determined. Fig 2.3.4 represents a Merkle Tree.
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Fig. 2.3.4: Merkle Tree [28]

Storing the hash of the previous block’s header in the current block helps a
blockchain achieve immutability. As mentioned earlier, even the slightest change
in the input for a hash function causes drastic changes to the output. When the
blockchain software attempts to verify the validity of a blockchain, it hashes each
block header and compares it with the value of the block header’s hash stored in the
next block. Since the merkle root stored in the header of the current block is a hash
of the transaction data in itself, if an attacker wants to modify the transaction data,
this would lead to a mismatch of the block header hash values being compared and
the validity of the blockchain would fail.
Details related to the consensus algorithm stored in the block header include the
difficulty value of the current cycle of leader node selection and the nonce value used
to mine the current block. These values will be further explained in detail in Section
2.4.
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2.3.3

Genesis Block

Every blockchain requires a starting point to which new blocks can be added. This
starting point is referred to as the genesis block. This block is created or mined by the
first node that joins the network, which also receives the block reward for generating
it.
Bitcoin’s first block was mined on January 3, 2009 at 18:15 UTC. Ethereum MainNet’s first block was mined July 30, 2015 at 15:26 UTC and it contains transactions
of their ICO (Refer Section 2.1).

Fig. 2.3.5: Ethereum Genesis Block

The genesis block usually contains configuration information that governs the
blockchain. It also specifies which consensus algorithm the blockchain uses.

2.4

Consensus Algorithms

Blockchains are, in essence, distributed systems. For the members of a distributed
system to agree on the state of its shared data, consensus algorithms are required.
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Consensus algorithms have been researched and developed since the early 1980s
with the primary intention of addressing tolerance of unintentional and unpredictable
faults in distributed computing networks and protecting the integrity of the system should such a fault arise. This is also referred to as the Byzantine Generals
Problem[21].
In blockchains, consensus algorithms are used to determine which participating
node of the network gets to modify the state of the blockchain, i.e, add a block to
the chain. Each node of the chain has its own unique set of transactions retrieved.
The node validates all of these transactions, builds the merkle tree and constructs the
block header and prepares to add the block to the chain. However, at this point it also
has to compete with thousands of other nodes to become the leader node that will
modify the blockchain. The incentive that the nodes have for trying to update the
state of the blockchain is a fixed amount of cryptocurrency extracted and rewarded
to the leader node.
Blockchain consensus algorithms are designed to prevent 51% attacks where a
single node or a group of nodes possess of 51% of the blockchain’s total available
compute power and prevent new transactions from being validated, thereby rendering
the blockchain unusable for the other participating members[39]. However, modifying
existing blockchain data beyond a certain checkpoint is impossible even for a group
of attackers that have the capability to perform a 51% attack due to the raw amount
of power required to recompute the conditions with which that particular block was
mined in accordance to the consensus algorithm and replicate this process across all
available nodes in the network.
Popularly used consensus algorithms are explained in-depth below.

2.4.1

Proof-of-Work

As the name suggests, Proof-of-Work is a consensus algorithm in which a participating node provides the amount of work it has put into collecting transactions and
generating a block of data in the blockchain as proof that it deserves to be the next
leader node.
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The core component of Proof-of-work, devised by Satoshi Nakamoto in his 2008
Bitcoin paper [31], is a cryptographic puzzle that network nodes need to solve to
become the leader node. In the Bitcoin protocol, this puzzle involves generating a
hash value of the block’s transaction data, but with a certain number of zeroes at the
beginning of the hash. The number of zeroes that the protocol determines the hash
value should have for this leader node election cycle is defined as the difficulty.

Fig. 2.4.1: Proof of Work [53]

Network nodes then start computing hash values by appending a number known
as nonce to the transaction data. The value of the nonce is constantly modified and
the hash is recomputed until a node achieves the target hash value. This process
is referred to as mining. Since this process is extremely computationally intensive,
miners on public blockchains use large clusters of physical hardware such as GPUs
and ASICs to improve their chances of becoming the next leader node.
PoW is an extremely time and resource consuming process. This means execution
of time-critical transactions is infeasible on a PoW network.
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Fig. 2.4.2: GPU Mining Farm [8]

PoW mining is detrimental to the environment due to the raw amount of electricity
it uses. Another consequence of PoW mining is the increasing difficulty of being able
to mine a block without large quantities of sophisticated hardware that the average
person cannot afford. This leads to centralization of wealth, i.e, ”the rich become
richer” scenario, which goes against the very philosophy of Bitcoin as envisioned by
Satoshi Nakamoto.

Fig. 2.4.3: ASIC Mining Farm [53]
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2.4.2

Proof-of-Stake

The Proof-of-Stake consensus algorithm was conceptualized as an alternative to Proofof-Work and to avoid the problems that are inherent to PoW mining. In Proof-ofStake, during a round of leader node selection in, a participating node provides the
amount of cryptocurrency it owns as a reason that it deserves to be the next leader
node and receive the block reward. This amount is locked into a deposit of sorts.
The more coins a node deposits as a stake, the higher its chance of being selected as
a leader node. If a node is selected as the leader node for this round, it receives a
block reward proportional to the amount it deposited.

Fig. 2.4.4: Proof-of-Stake [53]

Proof-of-Stake is better than Proof-of-Work as it completely removes the condition that more processing power is required to mine blocks. This encourages more
people to join the network as participating members, leading to more decentralization. Creation of new blocks and the authority to update the blockchain is not held
by people with raw processing power in Proof-of-stake networks.
One of the pitfalls of PoS is that it is dependent on the number of nodes in
a network to be high to prevent attacks and keep the network secure. For this
reason, many blockchain platforms that plan to use Proof-of-Stake as its primary
consensus are first started on Proof-of-Work protocol until the network has grown
into a significant size. Ethereum, which was first envisioned to be running on PoS,
is running on the Proof-of-Work algorithm Ethash until the developers decide it is a
good time to switch to Casper, their PoS protocol [7].
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2.4.3

Proof-of-Authority

Proof-of-Authority is a consensus algorithm inspired by Proof-of-Stake. It’s mainly
used in private blockchains. In PoA networks, nodes stake their identity and reputation rather than an amount of coins. Only a predefined set of nodes in the network
are allowed to validate new blocks and modify the state of the blockchain. This allows
for network scalability as the number of nodes that can add new blocks to the chain
remains the same regardless of the size of the chain. Another advantage of PoA is that
the time taken to generate a new block remains constant, unlike PoS and PoW. Some
networks generate a new block every 5 seconds or 10 seconds. This can prove useful
for scenarios where transfer of data or currency over the blockchain is a time-critical
process.
All the nodes in a private blockchain network are pre-authenticated i.e, the identity of each node is known to other members of the network. This makes private
blockchains suitable for using PoA consensus.
Ethereum provides an implementation of PoA named Clique.

2.5

Blockchain Platforms

In this section, an introduction to popularly available platforms is provided. Distinguishing features of each platform are also discussed.

2.5.1

Bitcoin

Bitcoin was the first blockchain, as well as the first cryptocurrency. It was introduced
in a 2008 paper by the pseudonymous researcher/group Satoshi Nakamoto [31]. The
idea behind Bitcoin was to utilize peer-to-peer technology to build a decentralized
payment system that provides transparency, preserves anonymity, and takes away
control from big banks.
Bitcoin’s genesis block was mined by Satoshi Nakamoto on January 3, 2009 at
18:15 UTC. This block’s header has a coinbase parameter that contains the message
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The Times 03/Jan/2009 Chancellor on brink of second bailout for banks [35].

Fig. 2.5.1: Bitcoin Genesis Block [35]

Bitcoin uses the Proof-of-Work consensus protocol (Refer Section 2.4.1). Only a
total of 21 million bitcoins can be mined. With each new generated block, an amount
of bitcoin is extracted from this 21 million and allocated to the node that generated
the block as a reward. At the time of writing, approximately 18.5 million bitcoins
have been mined and the value of 1 BTC stands at 11,650 USD.
Although the Bitcoin platform excels at its original vision of being a decentralized
payment system, it remains just that: a payment system. It does not provide a
lot of potential for applications in industry that could utilize its decentralization
and peer-to-peer technology. Its scripting language is extremely limited and not
Turing-complete. It also doesn’t provide a robust way to create private versions of
its blockchain network.

2.5.2

Ethereum

Ethereum was first presented in a white paper by Vitalik Buterin in 2014 [6]. Buterin’s vision was to create a decentralized system where not only the payments or
transactions that happen between members of the network would be transparent and
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decentralized by being on a blockchain, but the constraints that govern the transactions would also follow the same philosophy. This would be achieved using a concept
known as Smart Contracts which are code representations of a real life contract between parties.
Ethereum provides a Turing-complete programming language named Solidity that
allows developers to write smart contracts, deploy them on the blockchain and use
functionality from these deployed smart contracts to satisfy real life usecases. It also
provides the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), an isolated sandbox for the execution
of compiled smart contracts.
Ethereum software is available in many popular languages such as Go, Java,
Python etc. The go-ethereum client, otherwise referred to as Geth, is the most used
and well-maintained implementation of the Ethereum protocol.
Ethereum was the first blockchain that made it easy to create private versions that
can be used by a group of nodes whose identities are known to each other. To create
a private network, a node simply needed the Geth software installed and initialized
with its own unique Genesis Block configuration stored in a file. A simple genesis
block config file is shown in the below figure:

Fig. 2.5.2: Ethereum Genesis Configuration

The public Ethereum network’s genesis block was mined on July 30, 2015 at 15:26
UTC. It currently uses the Proof-of-Work protocol. However, as envisioned by its
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creators, it will soon switch to a Proof-of-stake based consensus algorithm named
Casper. It also provides a Proof-of-Authority configuration, named Clique, that can
be used in private versions of the blockchain network.
The various features provided by Ethereum made it easily adoptable in both public
and private forms. A rich developer community formed around it and the ecosystem
matured to make it the most preferable blockchain platform for businesses to develop
on.
Unlike Bitcoin, there is an infinite supply of Ether (ETH), the currency that
Ethereum runs on. Its value at the time of writing this is 1 ETH = 422.52 USD. The
smallest possible unit of Ether is Wei which is 1x10-18 ETH. Transactions that take
place on an Ethereum network have a set amount of Wei as cost that is given to the
node that validates the transaction and generates the block. This cost is referred to
as ’gas’. Another benefit this cost has is that inherently prevents a malicious actor
from executing long-running code that may create a DDoS scenario.

2.5.3

Hyperledger

While Bitcoin and Ethereum are blockchains, Hyperledger presents itself as a common
hub for various blockchain platform development-related projects. It was founded in
2015 by The Linux Foundation, with a primary focus on approaching the development
of blockchain platforms from an enterprise perspective. It is a collection of standards,
tools, and projects that enable the development of private blockchains for businesses.
Some of the projects available under the Hyperledger umbrella are:
• Fabric: A modular blockchain framework that an organization looking to develop a blockchain based business platform can use. Enables Smart Contract
development in well-known programming languages such as Javascript and
Python, which eliminates the need for developers to learn a new language like
Solidity. It supports only permissioned blockchain networks.
• Sawtooth: Blockchain platform that supports both permissioned and permissionless networks. Uses Proof-of-Elapsed-Time consensus algorithm.
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• Besu: An Ethereum client like Geth or Parity but more enterprise oriented.
It supports features provided by the Ethereum protocol such as mining, smart
contract development, JSON RPC API and event subscriptions.
• Caliper: A blockchain benchmark tool that can measure performance of Ethereum
and above-mentioned Hyperledger platforms. It measures Success rate, Transaction/Read throughput, Transaction/Read latency, and Resource consumption.

2.6

Blockchain Security

Although blockchains utilize industry-standard cryptography features to ensure security and integrity of the network, they are still vulnerable to attacks. Some of these
attacks are discussed below:

2.6.1

51% attacks

A 51% attack can occur when, as the name suggests, 51% of the total hashing power
available in the blockchain is comprised by a single entity: either a node, or a group
of nodes. In this attack, the malicious entity can completely stop new blocks from
being mined, or allow already completed transactions to be reversed.
Bitcoin has not suffered from a 51% attack yet due to the sheer amount of computing power it would require. As a blockchain network becomes bigger and more
members join, it becomes increasingly harder to conduct a 51% attack. But a number
of other blockchain platforms have suffered from this attack, most notably Bitcoin
Gold.

2.6.2

Double Spending

When a user on a blockchain can spend the same cryptocurrency on two different
transactions concurrently, but the user’s balance is updated to reflect only one of these
transactions, the user has effectively achieved double-spending. This vulnerability is
a consequence of 51% attacks.
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2.6.3

Malicious Forking

Similar to the previous attacks, this also requires an entity or a group of entities
sharing their resources to take over control of a blockchain network and modifying
the state of the blockchain by switching to a different chain with blocks containing
malicious transactions .

2.6.4

Exchange Hacks and DDoS Attacks

While blockchains are immune to DDoS attacks, and are often used as a measure to
protect against DDoS attacks themselves, cryptocurrency exchanges are still subject
to them. They are also attacked by hackers who steal sensitive data from exchange
members.

2.6.5

Social Engineering

Social Engineering is achieved in many ways, but the objective is always to obtain
private keys, login information, or more directly, cryptocurrency. Phishing is one of
the most common forms of social engineering. Malicious actors imitate someone a
trusted person in emails, messages, or social media accounts. There was a loss of $3
million in 2018 due to social engineering.
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CHAPTER 3
Blockchain-based Applications
As seen in Chapter 2, widespread research in blockchain technology has led to the
evolution of blockchains from being a data structure to the development of frameworks and architectures where blockchains are used as a component in a larger system.
Other components in the system interact with the blockchain in the form of transactions. These frameworks have found use in various industries including, but not
limited to, finance, trade, marketing, healthcare, and cybersecurity. In this chapter,
we provide an indepth explanation of how the frameworks are used to build applications that satisfy business usecases.

3.1

Blockchain-based Applications

Applications developed using aforementioned blockchain frameworks to satisfy a business case are referred to as blockchain-based applications.
One of the major milestones in the development of blockchain-based applications
was the introduction of Ethereum [6]. Bitcoin and Ethereum are public blockchains,
meaning anyone can download a copy of the blockchain and become a node in the
network. While this ensures decentralization, it also prevents possible applications
in enterprise where the public blockchain systems are unable to provide the required
performance. Users and nodes on public blockchains are also anonymous, identifiable
only through a hash address. A need for private blockchains was identified, thus
leading to the development of Hyperledger Fabric, a permissioned distributed ledger
technology, where all the participating nodes are known by the other nodes. Since
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there was no need for Proof of Work in a private blockchain, the transaction throughput was high, as required in enterprise standards. Furthermore, smart contracts in
Fabric could be written in normal Java or Javascript, eliminating the need to learn
a new programming language. Eventually, a permissioned variant of the Ethereum
blockchain named Quorum (https://consensys.net/quorum/) was developed, leading
to the formation of the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance (https://entethalliance.org/).
There are plenty of blockchain platform choices today for developing blockchainbased applications. However, in software engineering, it is important to narrow down
the choices by understanding which blockchain has features that would best support
the use cases of the system. It is also important consider potential issues that may
occur by choosing any given blockchain. Therefore, the software development process
should be approached with a blockchain-oriented perspective.

3.2

Smart Contracts

A smart contract is a code representation of a real life contract formed between parties
that want to engage in a business negotiation. The results of this negotiation can be
the transfer of cryptocurrency or other digital assets. They were first conceptualized
by Nick Szabo in 1998. [40]. Blockchain-based applications are built using a collection
of smart contracts.

3.2.1

Solidity

Solidity is the smart contract development language provided by the Ethereum framework. It is a Turing-complete language inspired by Object-oriented programming
languages such as Java and Javascript. A Turing-complete language is capable of
performing any possible mathematical operation if enough resources are allocated
to the computer performing the operation. This feature is important for a smart
contract language as the potential applications of blockchains are infinite and the
language that the blockchain supports must be able to facilitate these applications.
A sample contract is shown in Fig 3.2.1. It describes a set of rules that governs
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a cryptocurrency token named Coin, which includes functionality to mine the token
and reward it to the member that performed the action, and to send an amount of
the coin to another member.

Fig. 3.2.1: Simple Solidity contract

Solidity contracts are compiled using the solc compiler (github.com/ethereum/solidity).
Compiling the contract generates the Application Binary Interface and the bytecode
for the contract. When the contract is deployed to the live blockchain, the bytecode
of the contract is stored at a specific address on the blockchain itself.
The Application Binary Interface (ABI) provides information to external web
frameworks or libraries and enables them to interact with the blockchain as long as
they have the credentials required. We will discuss these frameworks in-depth in
Section 3.3.
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3.2.2

Lifecycle of a Smart Contract

1. Negotiate and form contract in human language
2. Translate contract to Smart Contract using a smart contract framework
3. Store contract on blockchain using a Contract-Creation Transaction
4. Execute contract on blockchain using a web DApp interface (Refer Section 3.3)
5. Monitor execution of contract
6. Optionally, terminate contract after terms are met

3.3

DApps

Blockchain-based applications are also known as DApps. DApps consist of two components:
1. The smart contracts on the blockchain that govern the transactions facilitated
by the DApp
2. The web interface that users can use to interact with the smart contracts on
the blockchain
Ethereum is a blockchain that also acts as a protocol to build DApps. It provides
a powerful application stack embedded within each node of the Ethereum network,
known as the Ethereum Virtual Machine. It also provides Solidity, a Turing-complete
language inspired by many object-oriented programming languages, to simplify and
standardize the development of DApps. The development of DApps in Ethereum is
achieved through writing smart contracts using Solidity and implementing other parts
of the DApp using Web3, a collection of libraries which provide interaction with the
Ethereum [30] [45] [46]. Web3 libraries are written in many popular languages such as
Javascript, Python etc. which helps developers comfortable with different tech stacks
build DApps easily.
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Fig. 3.3.1: Traditional Application vs DApp [42]

When a DApp interface built using a Web3 library wants to interact with smart
contracts to perform an operation that will result in a transaction or modify the state
of the blockchain, it requires the private key of the user initiating the operation on the
DApp. This can be achieved using digital wallets such as Metamask or MyEtherWallet, which inject their functionality directly into the DApp [15]. In private blockchain
scenarios, the private key can be directly passed into the code itself using Wallet
methods that the Web3 libraries provide.

Fig. 3.3.2: Metamask

27

3. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED APPLICATIONS

3.4

Smart Contract Vulnerabilities

Like any technology, smart contracts possess their share of issues and vulnerabilities.
These can affect involved parties financially. Another major point of note is that
blockchains are immutable. When a smart contract with a vulnerability is exploited,
the damages caused are irreversible.
The Smart Contract Weakness Classification registry (https://swcregistry.io/)
currently lists over 36 potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited in Solidity smart
contracts. Some of these vulnerabilities are discussed below:

3.4.1

Re-entrancy

The vulnerability behind the most popular attack on Ethereum. It can occur when
one smart contract that calls a function in another smart contract can interrupt the
exceution, start over again, and repeat this process multiple times, but finally result
in all function calls executing successfully and modifying the state of the system.

Fig. 3.4.1: Re-entrancy Attack [10]

This vulnerability was exploited during The DAO attack of 2016. The DAO was a
crowdfunding organization that set out with a mission to help new Ethereum related
startups obtain funding for their projects. The DAO had developed a smart contract
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to which people can deposit Ether, which can then be requested by a potential startup
for funding its projects. When an external smart contract called the function to
withdraw Ether from the DAO contract, it first transfers the Ether to the calling
contract and only then updates its own state that the Ether was transferred. This
was exploited by malicious actors who kept retriggering the withdraw function before
the state was updated. By the time the developers of Ethereum managed to stop
them, they had already siphoned off Ether worth 3.6 million USD.
The effects of this hack led to the value of ETH dropping from 20 USD to 13
USD. This resulted in the creation of a hard fork by the developers of Ethereum
attempting to undo the effects of the hack. A hard fork is a manually initiated
change in the order of blocks, and the hard fork was positioned at a block before the
DAO transactions. Some members still operate on the original chain, which is known
as Ethereum Classic.

3.4.2

Integer Underflow and Overflow

This vulnerability can occur when addition or subtraction operations are performed
on unsigned integer data that can result in the value exceeding the maximum possible
limit of the integer data type, or going lower than the minimum possible integer. This
can lead to incorrect amounts of Ether being transferred and have drastic effects on
transactions.

Fig. 3.4.2: Integer Underflow/Overflow
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In the above function, to perform a transaction between a sender and a receiver,
the balance of the sender is only checked to see if they have enough Ether to complete
the transaction. However, the balance of the receiver is not checked to see if an
integer overflow occurs. If the above transaction is performed and adding Ether to
the receiver’s balance causes an integer overflow, the receiver’s balance will be set to
a low and incorrect value.

3.4.3

Overlap Attack

When a smart contract is deployed onto the blockchain, its data is stored at some
address. The contract is responsible for ensuring that only authorized user or contract
accounts may write to sensitive storage locations. SWC details the attack as follows:
If an attacker is able to write to arbitrary storage locations of a contract,
the authorization checks may easily be circumvented. This can allow an
attacker to corrupt the storage; for instance, by overwriting a field that
stores the address of the contract owner.
One way to prevent common vulnerabilities that occur in any software is the
utilization of software design best practices during the development process. In the
next section, we provide a basic introduction to software design best practices and
how they can be utilized to decrease the chances of a smart contract’s vulnerabilities
and surface area of attack.

3.5

Design Patterns for Smart Contracts

In software engineering, best practices are a set of methodically proven approaches
to software development. Problems in software development can be addressed by
using these approaches in combination. ”Best practices” are referred to as such not
because we can accurately measure their value but rather because they are commonly
implemented in industry by experienced developers and successful organizations. One
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way to ensure best practices are followed is through the implementation of Design
Patterns.
Design patterns act as templates/reusable solutions to problems that commonly
occurs during software design for a given scenario . Patterns as a notion were firstly
introduced by Alexander et al.[3] in the field of architecture. Later they were modified
in order to fit software design by Gamma et al.[17], otherwise known as the Gang
of Four (GoF), who catalogued 23 design patterns. The GoF also suggested that
using design patterns makes the software maintainable and reusable, the design more
flexible, and the implementation more understandable.
Design Patterns are important for the development of DApps due to a single
property: immutability. This core feature of any blockchain architecture can make
or break a DApp. Data on a blockchain cannot be modified once it has been added.
If the DApp is designed and developed poorly, without taking design standards into
consideration, nothing can be done to fix the situation once any problems arise after
the DApp is deployed to the blockchain. It is important that blockchain software
development lifecycles require much more attention to bug-prevention than other
technologies.
In Section 4.2, commonly used design patterns for blockchain-based application
smart contracts are discussed.
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CHAPTER 4
Related Works
To achieve our research objective we identified the need to perform a survey of existing
literature in the following areas:
• Software engineering practices for Blockchain-based Applications
• Design patterns for various scenarios such as security, performance optimization,
system architecture, data encryption, migration etc.
• Metrics of software quality and performance, and methods and approaches to
analyze these metrics

4.1

Software Engineering Practices for Blockchainbased Applications

To understand how design patterns can be utilized in blockchain-based application
development, we first realized the need to determine the steps involved in the software
development process for blockchain-based application development. Since blockchainbased applications function differently than traditional web applications, they have
their own set of design requirements, development flow, and testing practices.
In 2017, Porru et al. [33] first identified the need for specialized tools and techniques for the development of blockchain-based applications. They suggested new
research directions for the development of DApps in the domains of Testing, Collaboration, Debugging and the creation of software tools for DApp languages.
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Marchesi et al. [27] further reiterate how software engineering practices are still
not applied optimally in the development of blockchain-based applications. They dive
deeper into modern software design and development practices, and propose methodologies for applying techniques such as Test Driven Design, Continuous Integration,
Pair Programming. Furthermore, they provide a new set of steps to assess the security of Smart Contracts/DApps, highlighting the need for development teams to
have a security mindset. They recommend implementing existing security patterns
during the design and development phases. Lastly, they highlight how their work
could prove useful to blockchain firms to develop a competitive advantage by using
software engineering practices from the ideation stage.
Destefanis et al. [11] identified that the chances of developing smart contract with
vulnerabilities can be reduced by using proper software development processes. They
use the Parity wallet attack of November 2017 as a case study and how it would not
have happened if proper software development best practices had been utilized. They
applied static analysis methods and tools to the Parity Wallet smart contract code,
and proposed development and testing processes that could have avoided the attack
if utilized.
In this section, we will take a look at how new software development methodologies
have been created to approach the design and development in a blockchain-based
application context. Each subsection will detail new methods used in each step of
traditional software development processes.

4.1.1

Gathering Business Requirements

Analyzing the business requirements of a project is the first step to ensure successful
design and development. It is all the more important when working with cutting edge
technologies like blockchains, as failing to establish proper business objectives can
lead to inefficiency and monetary loss during development in the form of unnecessary
expenditure. Table 6.2.3 provides a set of general considerations that act as business
requirements in a blockchain based system [23].
It is also important to take the costs of developing a blockchain-based application
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Table 4.1.1: General Business Requirements
Generic Requirement

Description

Data storage

In block/out of block

Node location

Network antennas, IoT.

Network bandwidth

G power (5G, 4G etc.)

Type of blockchain

Public, private, hybrid, consortium

Industry
Customer experience factors

User friendliness, accessibility

Overall goal of the system

Paragraph of objectives

Actors

Human and machine to machine

Authority level

Trusted, decentralized

External system interlaces

Other networks

Data structures

External interfaces

Internal functions

Modifiers

Tests

Security assessment

External subsystem

User stories, acceptance tests, UI

Precondition

Requirements to become an actor

into consideration to determine if using a blockchain is feasible. Rimba et al. [37]
estimated that using blockchain as an architecture increased the cost of development
and compute resources by two orders of magnitude. One of the ways by which resource
costs can be decreased is through proper system design.

4.1.2

System Design

Xu et al.’s highly cited work in [50] provides a taxonomy of blockchain-based systems
and how these systems can be implemented by understanding the requirements of the
application. They detail design patterns at the architecture level and demonstrate
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implementation of these patterns in a real scenario. The considerations in the design
process are as follows:
1. Is the authority trustworthy? If it is, can it be decentralized?
2. Should storage and computation take place on-chain or off-chain?
3. Is a new blockchain required? Or can the existing blockchains be used?
4. Are multiple blockchains required?
5. What type of blockchains are required?
6. What data structure needs to be used for the blockchain?
7. What consensus protocol should be used?
8. What should the block size and frequency of transactions be?
9. What should the incentive for mining be?
10. Is an anonymity mechanism required?
11. Where should the blockchain be deployed? On-premises or the cloud?
Rocha and Ducasse [38] also noted that there were no design standards for designing/modelling blockchain-based applications. They detailed three modelling approaches based on existing software design models.
• Data Driven: In this approach, the application is modelled using an Entity Relationship diagram, a tool often used in applications with relational databases.
The authors suggest that a Data Driven blockchain design model will be easy
to understand since ER modeling is a popular standard. Since blockchains
are essentially similar to databases, this model focuses on the design of the
blockchain-based application based on its data.

35

4. RELATED WORKS

• Structure Driven: In this model, UML is used to build the design of smart
contracts, which are similar to classes in object oriented programming languages. The authors note the ease of designing models and specifying functions
and properties in smart contracts using UML as an advantage. But they also
mention that the functional behavior of the business process cannot be specified
using this model.
• Process Driven: This approach overcomes the disadvantage of the previous
ones by using Business Process Model and Notation to specify business processes. This model is considered as the standard for designing business processes. However, one of the disadvantages with this approach is that complex
data cannot be modelled using BPMN. It is also difficult to build an overview
of the software as the focus is on individual business processes.

4.1.3

Implementation and Development

Smart contract development is mostly done using Solidity on the Ethereum blockchain.
Wohrer and Zdun [48] detail how developing smart contracts on Ethereum requires a
different approach in software engineering than most developers are experienced with,
since Solidity does not provide many tools and functions to perform tasks that developers usually do not need to think about in other languages. Solidity and Ethereum
also grow at a rapid pace with new innovations and bugs discovered every day, which
can be cumbersome for developers to keep track of.

4.1.4

Testing

Testing of blockchain-based applications is more difficult than traditional applications
due to the monetary and time sensitive nature of smart contracts. Koul [20] details
how, currently in the industry, the following steps are performed to test blockchainbased applications.
• Consensus: In a business network where the participants are known and trusted,
transactions can be verified and appended to the ledger using various means like
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Proof-of-Stake etc. Whatever maybe the consensus protocol followed, validated
data is appended to the ledger and acts a single source of truth. For a tester it
means ensuring the consistency and validity across multiple stakeholders.
• External Interaction: In a blockchain-based application, the blockchain is only
a component. Therefore it is important to test the interaction between the
blockchain and every other component of the system.
• Functional Testing: The tester needs to ensure that the terms and conditions
are correctly coded into the contract and that they are self triggered on arrival
of the legit data. Unit testing can be performed for each and every condition
and once they work completely in isolation, integration testing can test the
entire logic of contract as a whole. It is a good practice to test Smart Contracts
on a dummy blockchain or a virtualized service before deployment considering
its immutable nature.
• Performance Testing: The tester needs to ensure that speed is of utmost importance and inspite of horizontal and vertical scaling performance should not
hamper at all. In applications like Bitcoin where anyone is free to open a digital
wallet and perform exchanges, continuous performance testing and monitoring
is indispensable. Testers need to design scenarios which can combine all aspects
across the blockchain ecosystem and should include compound testing as well.
• Security Testing: Testers need to analyze the code for implementation based
security flaws as well as the distributed architecture for threats that could lead
of Denial of Service(DOS) or vulnerability exploitation. The threats need to be
modelled and anticipated properly in order to provide mitigation strategies and
detailed fixes. Automated security testing is a better approach to ensure the
integrity of the ledger with multiple applications.
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4.2

Smart Contract Design patterns for various
scenarios

In our literature survey, we found some resources that discuss common design patterns used in blockchain-based applications. This section compiles the patterns found
and presents each pattern with a pattern description, the need for the pattern and
the consequences of using it. Wherever applicable, real world context is provided
too. The work presented by Xu et al. in [49], Wohrer et al. in [47] and [48], Lu
et al. in [26], Zhang et al. in [52], and Lemiuex et al. in [25] was used to understand the different blockchain ecosystems (like Hyperledger and Ethereum) and also
to extract relevant design patterns. Additionally, [44] provides implementations for
certain design patterns using Solidity.
• Checks-Effects-Interactions:
Description - The contract first checks whether the necessary conditions are
met, then makes necessary changes to the contract state (effects) and finally
passes control to any other contract (interactions).
Need - If interactions with other contracts occur before the effects are recorded,
and the invoked contract makes a callback to the original one, the system state
can be exploited. This was evident in the hack of The DAO [5], where the
attacker made a recursive call to a contract’s function and was able to drain the
contract’s funds because the program flow never reached the part where effects
were recorded.
Consequences - The advantage of this software pattern is that it ensures all
debits and credits are recorded before any further transactions can be made. A
disadvantage is that this pattern is counter-intuitive to use in the sense that it
is generally good practice to wait for a function to execute successfully, before
making any changes that rely on the results.
• Secure Ether Transfer:
Description - This is infact, an anti-pattern - the low-level function, address.call()
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should not be used to invoke a contract. Instead, the higher-level address.send()
or address.transfer() should be preferred because they set a limit on the amount
of ether the contract can forward to any invoked contract.
Need - Since the low-level function will forward all remaining gas, using it allows
a theoretically infinite series of invocations to be made, provided the gas sent
in the first call is sufficient.
Consequences - The advantage here is that if the amount of gas is limited with
every new invocation, the recursion will end eventually due to insufficient funds.
A possible disadvantage is that changes in the amount of gas required for certain operations may render the high-level calls useless as they only forward a
small portion of the gas.
• Oracle:
Description - A contract or blockchain-based application may need to access
some information from the external world to verify a transaction. The oracle
pattern uses a third-party verifier to verify that information stored off-chain is
valid, before it can be relayed to the blockchain.
Need - There are several scenarios where a blockchain may need to access external data. This depends entirely on the application’s use-case but a few examples are stock market data, weather-related data and bank account information.
Since this information is stored off-chain and it’s validity may be compromised,
the trust generated on the blockchain can be compromised without even attacking the blockchain directly.
Consequences - Some considerations when using an oracle are to be sure you
can trust the third-party verifying your data. It can also be argued that this
introduces an element of centralisation in the blockchain-based application, but
that is something that can be controlled while developing the oracle itself as
shown by [19] and [9].
• Off-chain Datastore:
Description - If the raw data to be stored on the blockchain takes too much
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memory, use a hashed value for the entire raw data and store this hashed value
on the blockchain instead.
Need - Blocks in the blockchain can store only so much data. Since the blockchain
is a distributed store of data, every node in the network must store the entire
blockchain, which becomes infeasible if too much data is stored on every block.
Additionally on public blockchains, storing data requires money and can get
expensive quickly.
Consequences - The hash will let you know if the data has been tampered with
or not. However, tampering cannot be reversed and if the data is deleted or
lost, only its hash remains permanently.
• State Channel:
Description - Micro-transactions should not be stored on the blockchain - instead they should be stored off-chain and only the settlements should be stored
on-chain. There are several use-cases of this pattern, the most common being
the Lightning Network which was proposed as a solution to the Bitcoin scalability issue in [32].
Need - As mentioned, storing large amounts of data on the blockchain is not
sustainable due to scalability and at times cost issues. Especially in the case
of micro-transactions, the actual amount being paid is significantly lesser than
the processing fees and will take up as much space as any other transaction on
the blockchain.
Consequences - Using the state channel pattern can save storage space and the
cost to add transactions to the blockchain. A drawback could be the trustworthiness of the micro-transaction protocol which does not follow the blockchain’s
protocols.
• Contract Registry:
Description - Every contract and its address are stored off-chain as key-value
pairs. This mapping is mutable since it is off-chain which means that the address of any contract can be updated in the registry. Since all calls to any

40

4. RELATED WORKS

contract will now go through the registry, this leaves any dependencies intact.
Need - Code on a smart contract may need to be modified or updated to deal
with bugs and changing requirements. Since the data on a blockchain cannot
be modified, the registry pattern offers an abstraction over the contract labels
and their code.
Consequences - The advantage is that this allows us to update our smart contract logic and can be used to rectify bugs and errors. The registry being stored
off-chain may seem like a drawback but Ethereum itself stores a lot of important
data off-chain.
• Data Contract:
Description - Store data and code on separate contracts to decouple them.
Need - In the scenario where the data used by a contract is stored on the contract
itself, modifying the contract using the contract registry or proxy pattern will
mean rewriting all of the data to this updated contract as well. Since the
outdated contracts still remain on the blockchain and are only replaced by the
updated versions, the data will be stored redundantly with every version of the
contract [44]. Conversely, storing the data separately on another contract would
reduce this amount of redundant data storage and save space as well as money.
Consequences - The consequences of this separation are the obvious cost and
storage efficiency. Some negative consequences would be that this separation of
logic from data increases the complexity of code due to external calls. Moreover,
external calls increase the chances of unintended behaviour.
• Embedded Permission:
Description - Contracts must have an embedded permission field which allows
only authorized users to run certain functions. This is comparable to the enduser of a software system not having access to all the backend code logic.
Need - Certain contracts on the blockchain may have highly sensitive functions.
A good example of such a function is self destruct() in Solidity, which is an
OPCODE at the EVM level. The absence of an embedded permission for this
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particular function was leveraged in the Parity Wallet hack [11].
Consequences - To use this design pattern you must decide on the method to
check for permissions. For instance, you could perform authorization using the
user’s private key. This may pose problems when permissions change or when
private keys are lost as changing the authorized keys would mean modifying the
code.
• Factory Contract:
Description - Similar to the idea of a class in programming languages, this pattern advises storing a template contract on the blockchain to instantiate other
contracts that follow a similar structure.
Need - Using a factory contract helps make a DApp’s code modular and reduces
the amount of updates required when new functionality is added to the DApp.
It also ensures that certain design principles are consistent throughout the application which is an important feature.
Consequences - The factory contract will make it easier for a relative beginner to create contracts that contain predefined best practices. It reduces the
chances of having inefficient design but may however, imply extra costs. This
is specifically applicable if the application is running on a public blockchain as
it most likely will be.
• Emergency Stop:
Description - Include the ability for an authorized party to stop the execution
of a contract.
Need - If a contract is executing malicious functions recursively or for several
iterations, without an interrupt functionality, the malicious function can run indefinitely and all other nodes can do nothing till execution completes. While an
attacker hacked The DAO, other participants on the Ethereum network could
only watch as their money was slowly siphoned into the attacker’s contract.
Consequences - Having an authorized emergency stop functionality will allow
an authorized party to prevent any further damage in the case of malicious or
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erroneous executions. Choosing the authorized party is an important consideration. Moreover, having a single authorized individual may lead to centralisation
- to tackle this multi-party authorization can also be used.
• Speed Bump:
Description - Include a deliberately slow rate of execution for critical contracts.
Need - This pattern can limit the rate of execution of sensitive tasks. If too
many contracts try to execute some critical tasks simultaneously, it may cause
a Denial of Service on the blockchain. However, slowing down the execution of
these tasks will allow more concurrent execution and will safeguard from DOS
attacks.
Consequences - The obvious consequence of this pattern is that execution of
critical contracts will be slow and may cause inconvenience.
• Mutex:
Description - The mutex is used in a similar way to mutexes in traditional
programming. It will prevent a contract from executing any code in its parent
contract until the parent has finished execution completely. The parent contract
here is the contract that invokes another contract.
Need - Having a recursive call or a callback that modifies the state of the parent
before it has finished executing can cause serious issues as described several
times above. Using a mutex is just another way to make sure that attacks such
as the re-entrancy attack cannot occur.
Consequences - There aren’t many negative consequences of using a mutex generally if you find the mutex hindering your task, there’s probably a better
way to accomplish the task.
• Contract Balance-Limit:
Description - This pattern states that a contract should not hold any more funds
than a predefined balance-limit. It must reject any extra transaction made to
it except for forced payments like self destruct() and any mining rewards sent
to the contract.
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Need - This design pattern will reduce the risk if any individual contract is
compromised. Having a contract with too much capital reduces the target area
for a potential attack to take place.
Consequences - The consequences of this design pattern are that once the
balance-limit has been reached, the contract will not accept any more gas,
therefore nobody can invoke the contract again unless there is some provision
to send the funds elsewhere.
• Reverse Verifier:
Description - Sometimes an application may need to access data from the
blockchain. Much like the oracle design pattern, the reverse verifier is used
to verify the data being sent to an external source from the blockchain.
Need - It is common to store application data in a traditional database and
store only the hash on the blockchain. A shortcoming of this is that one cannot prevent any tampering of data in the database. But the tampering will
be detected thanks to the hash on the blockchain. This hash integrity is what
the reverse verifier will check for when blockchain data is requested by off-chain
components.
Consequences - One possible consequence of using a reverse verifier is that communication between external components and the blockchain may take some
time depending on the implementation of the reverse verifier. Additionally, the
reverse verifier must be a trusted party.
• Commit and Reveal:
Description - This pattern works by hiding certain ”secret” parameter values
of contracts and displaying only the final solutions. Only authorized users have
access to the secret values.
Need - If the internal state of a contract is visible to everybody on the network,
it is possible that a malicious user may take advantage of this and invoke the
contract with variables that change the state to one they desire. Using this
design pattern will hide certain variables from general users, reducing the prob-
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ability of calculated attacks like these.
Consequences - Implementing this pattern may require some overhead in terms
of code. Deciding access roles will also need some consideration to prevent
centralisation of the system.
• Mortal:
Description - Destroy contracts that are no longer used or needed by the application.
Need - In the Ethereum environment contracts as well as transaction records
can be stored as blocks on the blockchain. This means that any contract will
remain on the chain forever. However, the state of each contract is stored in a
database off-chain. To free up space, once a contract is no longer required, it
is suggested to destroy its state and other data related to it. It must be noted
however that the contract itself (the code) will always remain on the blockchain
due to its immutability.
Consequences - The advantage of deleting contracts that are no longer used is
that it saves storage space. This can be translated to economic savings and also
helps in making the application scalable.
• Automatic Deprecation:
Description - Similar to the mortal design pattern, this states that some contracts must be deprecated automatically after a certain amount of time has
elapsed.
Need - This pattern may be needed in very specific usage scenarios where for
example a contract is used only once.
Consequences - Generally a contract created for one-time use may not be good
practice, however in certain scenarios where it is required, this pattern will
ensure that the contract frees up space automatically and immediately. This
means that it does not have to rely on somebody physically destroying it - which
may not happen at all.
• Dynamic Binding:
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Description - Create a dynamic association between an authorized user’s address and a contract in such a way that the user’s address is not defined in the
contract. Instead, the authorized user will send a secret key to a third contract
which will forward the request to the desired contract if the key is valid.
Need - This pattern can be used in cases where an extra layer of security is
required. Since the authorized user’s address is not listed on the contract, it is
not visible to the public.
Consequences - This design pattern will ensure privacy of the user and also
respects the authorization and authentication protocols of the network. It may
increase gas overhead due to the extra contract invocations and may raise problems if the secret key is lost or compromised.
• Flyweight:
Description - Inspired in part by the Data Contract design pattern, the flyweight
contract stores data that is shared by a group of clients.
Need - Since this pattern is essentially a data contract the need is the same as
the Data Contract pattern - to decouple data from the programmatic logic. It
also helps conserve space by not storing redundant copies of the data with every
individual client.
Consequences - The consequences of using the flyweight are that a lot of storage
space is saved, which translates to money saved. It also means that updating
any contract will not affect the shared data. Some considerations while using
this pattern are that accessing the data may require extra gas and that some
provisions are required for when the data needs to be updated.
• Tight Variable Packing:
Description - Store static variables in smart contracts as the smallest possible
data type that they can fit in. For example don’t store a value as an int if it
could be stored as a byte.
Need - This is because storage costs money on Ethereum and other public
blockchains.
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Consequences - There are no negative consequences of using the pattern - it
should be followed in traditional programming as well, but has greater consequences in blockchain-oriented software.

4.3

Software Quality Metrics in Solidity

To establish the impact of the design patterns mentioned in the previous section on
software quality, it is important to determine the metrics used to objectively analyze
the quality of software.
Zhang et al. [51] argued that, despite their prominence in software engineering,
design patterns have not been subjected to other than limited empirical evaluation,
and that much of this has also only been studying patterns indirectly. They also
explain that the quality of the available studies generally proved inadequate for to
be able to identify any firm guidelines about when to use (or not to use) particular
patterns.
Amptazoglou et al. [4] describe the importance of software quality among software
development teams. They also proposed a methodology to determine the quality of
the software using various metrics and criteria. They concluded that using design
patterns such as Bridge pattern and Abstract Factory pattern in software development
improved software quality significantly.
However, the above studies are related to design patterns in traditional software.
No studies have been performed to measure the impact of design patterns on software
quality in blockchain-based applications at the time of writing this thesis.
Gas is a cost associated with each operation available in Solidity and, by extension,
the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Each unit of gas consumed by a transaction or
contract has a cost attached to it, which is paid as fees to the block miner. Ajienka et
al. [1] identified a significant correlation between the application of and metrics used
in traditional Object-Oriented Programming to gas consumption in Solidity. The
authors identified that the gas usage was most sensitive to the Lines of Code metric.
An extensive set of tools to statically analyze code quality in Ethereum smart
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contracts have been developed over the past few years. Static Analysis involves the
detection of vulnerabilities and the estimation of code quality by parsing the source
code using different approaches. Durieux et al. [13] performed an empirical analysis
of static analysis tools and determined their ability to detect vulnerabilities. They
determined that these tools can provide an objective measure of smart contract code
quality.
Static Analysis tools provide a summary of smart contract vulnerabilities present
in the smart contract analyzed. The presence of these vulnerabilities can help determine the quality of the smart contract. Generally, high risk issues present in the
smart contract code represent a vulnerability that can be exploited. If a contract
has a high risk issue, it is deemed insecure. Presence of medium and low risk issues
represent usage of bad patterns that can be avoided. For example, Slither describes
the following smart contract issues as high risk [16]:
• Right-To-Left-Override control character is used
• State variables shadowing
• Functions allowing anyone to destruct the contract
• Uninitialized state variables
• Uninitialized storage variables
• Functions that send ether to arbitrary destinations
• Controlled delegatecall destination
• Reentrancy vulnerabilities
Static Analysis tools are further discussed in Section 5.1.3.
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CHAPTER 5
Methodology
In Section 4.2 we provided a list of design patterns implemented in blockchain-based
applications. We also provided a set of code quality metrics and ways to measure them
in Section 4.3. Based on our literature survey, to determine impact of design patterns
on code quality in blockchain-based applications we follow a two-step approach:
1. Analyze design patterns, quality metrics, and vulnerabilities that are present in
existing open source blockchain-based applications
2. Build two versions of a blockchain-based application, one with design patterns
and one without; compare quality metrics, resource consumption, and vulnerabilities

5.0.1

Blockchain Platform Considerations

As seen in Section 2.5, Ethereum and Hyperledger provide smart contract development platforms that can help us perform both of the steps mentioned above. However,
we observed the following when comparing the two platforms:
• Ethereum had a more mature blockchain-based application development platform. It is being utilized across every industry and has a wide range of tooling,
documentation, and community support compared to Hyperledger.
• Ethereum has a comprehensive list of currently present smart contract vulnerabilities, available at https://swcregistry.io/
• It also has a large suite of static analysis tools (Refer Section 5.1.3)
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• Hyperledger’s smart contracts can be written in any language. However, at
the time of writing this thesis, there is only one smart-contract related static
analysis tool available for Hyperledger. This tool is also applicable only to
Hyperledger Fabric contracts written in the Go language.
• Most importantly, Solidity had a extensive list of platform-oriented design patterns that provide value for our research (Refer Section 4.2)
• Generally, design patterns are language-agnostic. However, extensive research
in blockchain design patterns has been done only for Solidity. There is very
minimal research on design patterns for Hyperledger smart contracts.
For the above reasons, we are choosing Ethereum as our platform of research
interest over Hyperledger. In Step 1, smart contracts written in Solidity will be
retrieved from Etherscan. For Step 2, the blockchain-based application will be built
on the Ethereum blockchain.

5.1

Step 1: Analyze existing DApp Smart Contracts

This step involves retrieval of publicly available smart contracts from Etherscan and
performing static analysis on the retrieved contracts. These contracts will also be
subjected to a custom design pattern detection tool.
In Section 5.1.1, we provide some basic information on Etherscan and and its API
to retrieve verified contracts. In the subsequent sections, we detail how we gather gas
usage metrics and vulnerability metrics from the retrieved contracts, and the tools
used to retrieve them. We also provide some basic details about a design pattern
detection tool we built to achieve the objective of our research.
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5.1.1

Etherscan

Etherscan is a public service that lets anyone view the state of the Ethereum blockchain,
the blocks that are being mined, and the transactions in those blocks. It also has
a smart contract verification system that allows developers to upload contracts to
Etherscan directly, which are then subjected to an auditing process. This helps users
determine if a smart contract is safe to use and if it has been published by a trusted
authority. Fig 5.1.1 shows an example of an Etherscan verified contract.
Verified contracts are also flattened, i.e. source code of other contracts and libraries that are imported by this contract are stored within the same Solidity source
file as the verified contract.

Fig. 5.1.1: Etherscan Verified Contract

5.1.2

Gas Consumption and Lines of Code

As mentioned in Section 4.3, gas is a cost associated with each operation available in
Solidity and, by extension, the Ethereum Virtual Machine. Each unit of gas consumed
by a transaction or contract has a cost attached to it, which is paid as fees to the block
miner. Table 5.1.1 lists the gas consumed for important operations by the EVM.
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Table 5.1.1: Gas Costs in Ethereum
Value

Mnemonic

Gas Used

Notes

0x00

STOP

0

Halts execution.

0x01

ADD

3

Addition operation

0x02

MUL

5

Multiplication operation.

0x03

SUB

3

Subtraction operation.

0x04

DIV

5

Integer division operation.

0x05

SDIV

5

Signed integer division operation (truncated).

0x06

MOD

5

Modulo remainder operation

0x07

SMOD

5

Signed modulo remainder operation.

0x08

ADDMOD

8

Modulo addition operation.

0x09

MULMOD

8

Modulo multiplication operation.

The gas cost analysis is performed by compiling the contract source code into its
ABI and bytecode, and obtaining the gas cost using Web3 libraries that provide gas
estimation methods. The Lines of Code will be obtained using Solidity Parser Engine
in Javascript.

5.1.3

Static Analysis

Durieux et al. [13] compared 33 available smart contract analysis tools. Some of
these tools are used for performing static analysis. The static analysis tools that were
suitable for our security analysis use case were considered:
• Mythril: Reported by Durieux et al. [13] to have the highest accuracy. Although
[13] reports that this tool was fast, in our environment, the execution was very
slow. Analysis of a single contract took 18 minutes on average.
• Slither: Most popularly used static analysis tool for Solidity. Developed by
Feist et al. [16]. Reports on a number of issues related to Re-entrancy, gas
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costs, and ether exploitations.
• Remix Static Analyzer: Provided by the developers of Ethereum itself. Provides
a comprehensive report on gas costs and presence of SWC issues. Available only
in the Remix IDE on the browser. Does not expose APIs, therefore not easily
automatable.
• Smartcheck: Developed by Tikhomirov et al. [41]. Performs static analysis by
converting Solidity code into XML and identifies paths that could be potentially
related to security exploits.
• Securify: Designed by Tsankov et al. [43]. Constructs dependency graphs from
source code to detect security violations. A dependency graph is a directed
graph representing dependencies of several objects towards each other. Provided
as a SaaS product and also distributed open-source in the form of a docker
container.
• Oyente, Maian, and Osiris: This tool uses a method called symbolic execution.
In this method, the tool executes smart contract code by providing different
inputs and explores multiple paths that a program could take.
When we analyzed these tools for experimentation feasibility, we discovered that
Mythril was too slow in its analysis. Furthermore, Oyente, Maian, and Osiris were not
maintained and simply did not work. Since Remix could not be automated, we also
did not choose it. Our final set of static analysis tools includes Slither, Smartcheck,
and Securify.

5.1.4

Design pattern detection

Since there are no available design pattern detection tools for Solidity at the time of
writing this thesis, we will build our own. Common usage of patterns based on our
literature survey will be used to build a tool to detect if a particular smart contract
employs a specific design pattern.
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A wide variety of methods have been used in existing literature to detect design
patterns in source code. Ghazi Al-Obeidallah et al. [18] conducted a survey and
provided an analysis of the following methods being used for design pattern detection:
• Structural Analysis
• Semantic Analysis
• Behavioral Analysis
• Metrics Based Approaches
• Database Query Approaches
• UML-based Approaches
Rasool et al. [34] implement a Database Query approach and use predefined
regular expressions to obtain information about design patterns from the source code.
We are using this method to build a tool that can detect design patterns in Solidity
smart contracts. This method is suitable for Solidity because there is very little
variety in how Solidity code is generally written as well in the implementation of
the patterns themselves. A lot of code reuse also occurs in the development of smart
contracts. While other design pattern detection methods can be utilized, the research
and effort required to build them would be beyond the scope of our thesis.
The exact regular expressions used and the patterns they are associated with are
detailed in Section 6.1.2.

5.2

Analysis of custom blockchain-based application: ChequeChain

In the second step of our approach, we build a custom blockchain-based application
as a case study in which software patterns are applied to smart contracts to satisfy
design requirements.
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ChequeChain is a cheque clearance system built on blockchain technology. The
primary purpose of this system is to provide a general idea of how blockchains can
be used to simplify, automate, and accelerate the process of cheque clearance.
ChequeChain is not intended to be a replacement for physical cheques as a financial
instrument. Its only purpose is to demonstrate how blockchains can ease interbank
cheque processing without the need for dedicated clearinghouses.
ChequeChain is built using a private Ethereum blockchain. Each node in the
ChequeChain network represents an actual bank and performs the following roles to
achieve the purpose of the system:
• Act as a full-stack web service for its corresponding bank
• Act as a blockchain node
• The web service component can serve webpage requests received from the bank’s
teller systems
• Handle requests to perform CRUD operations on customer and cheque data
• Interact with the blockchain to send and receive cheque related data
• Monitor events on the blockchain that involve the bank

5.2.1

General Operational Scenario

A simple ChequeChain cheque clearance flow consists of the following steps:
1. Person A receives a cheque from Person B
2. Person A takes their cheque to their bank, Bank A
3. Bank A’s teller enters the details of the cheque (cheque number, transit number,
financial institution number, payor account number, payee account number) into
the system by using Bank A’s ChequeChain web application.
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4. The webservice generates a unique id to represent the cheque across all banks
in the ChequeChain network.
5. When the cheque is entered into the bank’s database, an operation is initiated
by the webservice to store the cheque’s details on the blockchain. We can refer
to this as a Cheque Storage Operation.
6. The blockchain processes the operation and stores the data on a block.
7. Bank B’s webservice has an event monitor that is looking for cheque storage operations on the blockchain with cheques that have Bank B’s financial institution
number.
8. When it detects such an event, the ID of that operation is obtained and Bank
B’s webservice looks up the data associated with that operation ID.
9. The data is retrieved by Bank B’s webservice and stored in its database.
10. The data is then processed to determine if Person B has enough funds to pay
for that cheque.
11. If Person B has enough funds, Bank B’s webservice initiates an operation to
store the result of this verification process on the blockchain. The data stored
by this operation includes the unique identifier of the cheque, the financial
institution number of Bank A and the status of the cheque verification.
12. Bank A’s webservice is monitoring events on the blockchain as well, and when it
detects the verification event of the cheque, it retrieves the status and updates
the status of the cheque in its database accordingly.
In ChequeChain, smart contract code for cheque storage is written and stored
on the blockchain for the webservice to execute. Since this code is available to all
members of the blockchain, transparency in the cheque storage process is preserved
without the need for a third party. When a bank’s webservice executes the smart contract code to perform cheque storage, it uses a Web3 library to perform the operation
and sign it using a unique public/private keypair.
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5.2.2

Technical description of Architecture

As mentioned before, each node in the ChequeChain network represents a bank and
acts as a webservice to handle in-bank cheque operations. A single node in the
network looks like this:

Fig. 5.2.2: Single Chequechain Node

Each component of the node is described in detail below
5.2.2.1

Banking Website Renderer

This component acts as the entry point for a cheque into the system. Bank tellers
access this web application to onboard new customers into the system, and to enter
cheque information. Our ChequeChain implementation uses Nuxt.js for this component. Nuxt is a progressive SSR framework that uses Vue.js under the hood. We
have chosen Nuxt due to its ease of use and tooling support. We can use any frontend
framework to build this component.
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5.2.2.2

Banking Database

The database is where a bank stores the cheque and customer data for its internal
reference. In our ChequeChain implementation, we utilized SQLite because of its
small size. Any database can be used because the webservice uses an ORM (ObjectRelational Mapping) framework to interact with the database. An ORM removes the
need to use explicit SQL queries and provides flexibility with data representation.
5.2.2.3

Banking API/WebService

The API/WebService is the central point of the ChequeChain node. It handles requests sent by the frontend, connects to the database to store cheque data, and
interfaces with the blockchain. This component has been implemented using Node.js
with Express as the API framework. All the code is written using Typescript to
ensure type safety, ease of development, and usage of best practices. The WebService
uses ethers.js, a Javascript implementation of Ethereum Web3, to interact with the
blockchain. When a cheque needs to be stored on the blockchain, the address of the
smart contract containing the logic required to perform this operation is passed to a
ethers.js function. This function also receives the unique identity of the bank node
as a parameter and executes the smart contract.
5.2.2.4

Ethereum Client

The Ethereum Client is simply an instance of the Ethereum blockchain running on
a specific machine. When a new transaction is created, the operation takes place
on all Ethereum clients in the network. This is achieved using an Ethereum Virtual
Machine, a sandboxed environment used for execution of smart contract code. The
block is then created and the state of the blockchain is replicated across all the nodes
in the blockchain using Consensus Algorithms. Proof-of-work, otherwise popularly
known as mining, is one such algorithm. The Ethereum Client is not a necessary
component for the bank as the banking WebService connects to the overall blockchain
network, not to an individual client. However, having the Ethereum Client run in each
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bank helps us achieve true decentralization and trust between all the members of the
ChequeChain network. The Ethereum client used in ChequeChain is go-ethereum,
also popularly known as Geth.

5.2.3

Network Architecture

For a new bank to join the network, it needs to build a node with all of the above
components. There are two channels of communication for a node in the network:
communication between the banking API and the Ethereum client, and P2P communication with other nodes on the blockchain.
The first channel is achieved by connecting the API to Port 8545 on the Ethereum
client, which exposes a JSON RPC endpoint that the API’s Web3 library can connect
to. This is used to retrieve block, account, and transaction information.
The second channel is achieved by exposing port 30301 and 30303 on the Ethereum
client. These ports allows the Ethereum client to discover and connect to other nodes
running the Ethereum client in the network. Ethereum uses a Distributed Hash
Table-based protocol to discover and connect to other nodes [22].
To mine the genesis block, a bootnode is first initialized with the initial genesis.json
configuration. The bootnode is simply a rendezvous point for setting up the Ethereum
blockchain. Starting up the bootnode also generates an address known as the enode
url. Other nodes running the Ethereum client can connect to the enode url and port
30301 of the bootnode.
Fig 5.2.3 shows a WeaveScope visualization of a ChequeChain network with a
bootnode/genesis node and a single banking node. The services running on these
nodes are in the form of Docker containers, and WeaveScope is a tool used to visualize
a network of Docker containers.
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Fig. 5.2.3: ChequeChain network with one bank

Fig 5.2.4 shows three banking nodes in a ChequeChain network. From Fig 5.2.3
and Fig 5.2.4 it is obvious that any connection between banking nodes exists only as
part of P2P communication between the Ethereum clients on the banking nodes. It is
also apparent that all the Ethereum clients are interconnected to each other, forming
a fully meshed distributed network, therefore avoiding issues that can arise with a
single point of failure.

5.2.4

Smart Contracts

Smart Contracts will be written using Solidity for the following purposes:
• Cheque Storage:

The primary purpose of the ChequeChain network is to

act as a medium of transfer of cheque data between different banks on the
network without the need for dedicated clearinghouses. This requires a Smart
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Fig. 5.2.4: ChequeChain network with three banks
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Contract with a function to write cheque data and store it on the blockchain at
a particular address.
When a cheque storage transaction occurs, an event containing details of the
transaction and the payor financial institution number will be emitted, and this
event will be detected by the concerned payor bank. The same contract from
before will also contain a read function that the Payor Bank API’s Web3 library
can access to retrieve the cheque data stored on the blockchain.
• Cheque Clearance:

After retrieving the cheque data from the blockchain,

the Payor Bank API verifies if the payor has enough funds and performs its own
cheque validation operation. If all the required criteria are satisfied, the Payor
Bank API uses its Web3 library that initiates a transaction to store a struct
which contains the cheque identifier, payee bank financial institution number
and a boolean value representing the clearance status of the cheque. When this
transaction is performed, a ChequeClearance event is emitted which is detected
by the Payee Bank’s API and the information in this transaction is used to
update the Payee Bank’s database.
• Cheque Settlement:

Cheque Settlement is a process in which two banks,

say A and B, calculate the total amount from the cheques in which they were
a payor and subtract the amount from which they were a payee, at the end of
the working day. If the difference for Bank A is positive, then the Bank A has
to pay the amount to the to Bank B. If the difference is negative, then Bank B
has to pay Bank A.
This process has to be scheduled to occur at the same time everyday. However, Ethereum provides no native implementation of a scheduling protocol like
cron. Therefore, to achieve Cheque Settlement, a smart contract library named
Ethereum Alarm Clock is used. It provides a Web3 interface to schedule
and execute transactions on the Ethereum blockchain [29].
This transaction can involve the transfer of ETH or a custom cryptocurrency.
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5.2.5

Design Patterns to be used

The following design patterns will be used to achieve business requirements for the
project. The type of contract that the pattern will be used for, the need for the
pattern, and a sample usecase is provided for each pattern.
• Oracle
Contract Type - Cheque Storage, Cheque Settlement
Need - To verify data retrieved from external sources by a smart contract
Usecase - Get realtime data about currency exchange rates in a trusted manner.
The function that achieves this will be stored in a separate contract.
• Contract Registry
Contract Type - Cheque Storage, Cheque Clearance, Cheque Settlement
Need - Store external contract addresses in a database/registry to avoid having
to modify smart contract code. Although smart contracts are immutable, they
can be updated, which moves them to a different address. These addresses can
be stored in an external database and update them when needed.
Usecase - When we are adding more supported currencies to the oracle contract
and updating it, we can update the new address of the oracle contract in the
database rather than having to upgrade the calling contract.
• Proxy Contract
Contract Type - Cheque Storage, Cheque Clearance, Cheque Settlement
Need - Contract registry is not tamperproof since it is offchain. For example,
a bad actor can modify the registry to send transactions to a malicious smart
contract. Storing the address of the contract in another contract can help
mitigate this.
Usecase - When we are adding more supported currencies to the oracle contract
and updating it, we can update the new address of the oracle contract in a
separate contract rather than having to upgrade the calling contract.
• Factory Contract
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Contract Type - Cheque Storage
Need - To provide a common template to generate similar contracts
Usecase - Cheque storage has different versions depending on the design patterns being implemented. These different versions can be created from a single
template contract.
• Access Restriction
Contract Type - Cheque Storage
Need - To prevent members of the chain from accessing functions they shouldn’t
Usecase - Bank C should not be able to see details of a cheque transaction
between Bank A and Bank B
• Flyweight
Contract Type - Cheque Settlement
Need - Store information that is accessible to all smart contracts on a separate
data contract
Usecase - Store public information about banks that is accessible to all other
contracts in the chain. This can be used for Cheque Settlement, to look up
addresses of the bank to send transactions to.
• Reverse Verifier
Contract Type - Cheque Clearance
Need - When an offchain entity (eg. Banking API) requests information from
the blockchain and it needs to verify the information retrieved, this pattern is
used
Usecase - Retrieving cheque data from the chain
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CHAPTER 6
Experiments and Results
In this chapter, we present our implementation of the two step approach proposed in
Chapter 5, and the results obtained from performing experimentation using various
static analysis tools.

6.1

Analyzing existing DApp Contracts

6.1.1

Dataset

A list of ∼100,000 verified contracts that are currently active on the main Ethereum
network was retrieved from Etherscan, using its API. The dataset contained the
following fields:
• Contract Address: The memory location of the contract on the blockchain
represented in hexadecimal notation
• Contract Name: The name of the contract as specified in the smart contract
code
• Transaction Address: The address of the transaction that deployed the smart
contract to the blockchain
From this set, we first extracted a subset of 10 smart contracts at random to
perform an initial round of analysis and manually audited the results on them. Then
we performed the analysis again on 200 smart contracts. The final results shown for
each step in this section were obtained from a set of 1000 random smart contracts.
66

6. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS

6.1.2

Pattern Detection

As mentioned in Section 5.1.4, since there are no design pattern detection tools available for Solidity at the time of writing this thesis, a regular expression based design
pattern detection tool was developed. Based on specifications and usage of Solidity
design patterns presented by Xu et al. in [50] and [49], Wohrer and Zdun in [48], and
Zhang et al. in [52], we constructed a set of regular expressions to detect the following patterns. These patterns were chosen because their presence could be determined
using regular expressions. Some patterns like Reverse Verifier are not checked for
because their implementation is on the API/web interface side of the DApp and their
presence cannot be determined from smart contract code. The patterns and their
associated regular expressions are listed below.
• Mortal:
/mortal|selfdestruct/g
• Proxy:
/Proxy/g
• Factory:
/Factory/g
• Re-Entrancy Guard:
/contract\sReentrancyGuard/g
• Oracle:
/oracle/gi
• Stoppable:
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/stopped|pause/gi
• Eternal Storage:
/Storage/g
• Tight Variable Packing:
/pack/gi
• Access Restriction:
/require\(msg\.sender/gi
The regular expressions for the above patterns and the code to analyze the contracts for patterns were written in Javascript. The results of the pattern detection
analysis are presented in Fig. 6.1.1.

Fig. 6.1.1: Number of contracts implementing a certain design pattern

In Fig. 6.1.1, although the detection of patterns is shown in the graph, it does not
mean that only that particular design pattern was detected in that contract i.e. the
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pattern detection results are not mutually exclusive. We performed another analysis
in which we determined the number of contracts without any patterns and contracts
where a number of patterns were being used. This data can be used to determine
how the presence of multiple patterns in a contract affects the code quality of the
contract. Fig 6.1.2 shows a mutually exclusive chart of percentage of contracts in the
dataset implementing a number of patterns that we were able to detect.

Fig. 6.1.2: Number of patterns per contract

The results obtained from this analysis show that a majority of the contracts in
our dataset did not implement any design patterns that we could detect. However a
significant number of them implemented atleast one design pattern. In subsequent
sections, we utilize this data to determine how the presence of multiple patterns affects
the code quality of a smart contract.

6.1.3

Gas Used and Lines of Code

This step was performed using the Solidity Compiler API and Web3 library written in
Python, and Solidity Metrics Analyzer API in Javascript. The contracts in the dataset
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were programmatically compiled using the Solc API and the gas cost estimation was
achieved using the output from the compiler as input for web3.eth.estimateGas()
function. Then the number of lines of code for each contract were calculated using
the Solidity Metrics Analyzer and the relationship of Gas Used per line of code and
pattern usage was plotted, as shown in Fig. 6.1.3
In this step, we observed that the effect of usage of design patterns on Gas Usage
varied from pattern to pattern, but overall, design patterns enabled better usage of
resources. The reason for Mortal pattern having higher Gas Used could be related
to the fact that the selfdestruct() function, which forms a core part of the Mortal
pattern, consumes negative gas.

Fig. 6.1.3: Gas Used per Line of code, with or without patterns

6.1.4

Slither

Slither is provided as a CLI application that takes in a contract address or a directory
of Solidity contracts as input, and generates a summary of all the issues found in them.
Fig 6.1.4 shows an input contract being analyzed for presence of high, medium, and
low issues.
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Fig. 6.1.4: Slither Analysis

We wrote an automation tool using Javascript to perform the above analysis on our
dataset of smart contracts. Each contract is first analyzed to determine if it utilizes
a pattern or not, and then the presence of security vulnerabilities (high issues) in the
contract is checked for by running the Slither CLI tool. The results of this analysis
are recorded in Fig 6.1.5. On average, it took 1 miunte and 17 seconds for Slither to
analyze a contract.

Fig. 6.1.5: Slither: Number of insecure contracts, with or without patterns
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In Fig 6.1.5, we can notice that the probability of presence of a security vulnerability is higher in smart contracts that do not utilize a design pattern.
Fig 6.1.6 shows the relationship between the number of patterns present in a smart
contract and the number of security vulnerabilities the contract has. There is a clear
downward trend in the decrease of presence of security vulnerabilities w.r.t to an
increase in the number of patterns used.

Fig. 6.1.6: Slither: Number of insecure contracts vs number of patterns

6.1.5

Smartcheck

Similar to Slither, Smartcheck is provided as a CLI application that takes in a specific
Solidity contract as input, and identifies individual issues found in them. Fig 6.1.7
shows an input contract being analyzed for presence of issues.
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Fig. 6.1.7: Smartcheck: Analysis of an input contract

However, unlike Slither, Smartcheck did not provide a visualization or a summary
in the CLI to determine if an issue shown is high risk or not. This information
was provided in the documentation for the application, and the following issues were
deemed high risk that made a contract insecure and open to exploits.
• SOLIDITY UNCHECKED CALL
• SOLIDITY BALANCE EQUALITY
• SOLIDITY GAS LIMIT IN LOOPS
• SOLIDITY ARRAY LENGTH MANIPULATION
• SOLIDITY TX ORIGIN
• SOLIDITY BALANCE EQUALITY
• SOLIDITY LOCKED MONEY
• SOLIDITY EXTRA GAS IN LOOPS
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Fig. 6.1.8: Smartcheck: Number of insecure contracts, with or without patterns

The results of the analysis performed using Smartcheck are provided in Fig 6.1.8
and 6.1.9. On average it took 39 seconds for Smartcheck to analyze a contract. We
can see the results obtained from this step are very similar to the results of the Slither
analysis. In both figures, insecure contracts refer to contracts that had a presence of
high security issues mentioned above.
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Fig. 6.1.9: Smartcheck: Number of insecure contracts vs number of patterns

6.1.6

Securify

Unlike Slither and Smartcheck, Securify is not a CLI application. Rather, it is distributed as a Docker image that runs a Python script as its entrypoint. This Python
script takes a contract file as its input and identifies issues found in them and also
categorizes them as critical, high, medium, or low. Fig 6.1.10 shows an input contract
being analyzed for presence of issues.
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Fig. 6.1.10: Securify: Analysis of an input contract

Fig. 6.1.11: Securify: Number of insecure contracts, with or without patterns

The results of the analysis performed using Smartcheck are provided in Fig 6.1.11
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and 6.1.12. On average, it took 1 minute and 46 seconds for Securify to analyze a
contract. We can see the results obtained from this step are very similar to the results
of the Slither analysis. In both figures, insecure contracts refer to contracts that had
a presence of high security issues mentioned above.

Fig. 6.1.12: Securify: Number of insecure contracts vs number of patterns

6.2

Analysis of ChequeChain contracts

In this section we present the results of performing static analysis on smart contracts
written to achieve the business requirements as detailed in Section 5.2.5.
Each of the below subsections provides tabulated results of performing gas usage
analysis and static analysis and detection of high, medium, and low risk issues on a
flattened contract using a specific tool. The analysis is first performed on a flattened
contract not implementing the design pattern, and then on a contract implementing
the pattern. Unlike Step 1 of our two-step approach, all the analyses in this step were
done manually.
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Table 6.2.1: ChequeChain Slither Analysis
Pattern

Contract

Gas Used

LoC

High

Medium

Low

Storage

2563829

130

2

4

3

Clearance

1139844

55

1

2

2

Settlement

1899021

87

2

6

2

Storage

2298763

108

1

5

3

Settlement

1803294

75

0

6

3

Storage

2298763

110

1

5

3

Clearance

1089324

50

0

2

2

Settlement

1822324

85

2

5

3

Storage

2091723

108

1

5

3

Clearance

1002319

50

1

2

2

Settlement

1317324

85

2

5

3

FactoryContract

Storage

2298763

120

1

5

3

AccessRestriction

Storage

2602218

135

0

4

3

Flyweight

Settlement

1903391

95

1

1

2

ReverseVerifier

Clearance

1092131

69

1

2

2

No Pattern

Oracle

ContractRegistry

ProxyContract

From the results obtained by performing static analysis using Slither, we observed
that the number of high risk issues in smart contracts that employ design patterns
was lesser than in contracts without design patterns. However, the same could not
be said about medium and low risk design patterns. In some cases, the number of
medium and low risk issues actually increased with the use of certain design patterns
such as Oracle.
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Table 6.2.2: ChequeChain Smartcheck Analysis
Pattern

Contract

Gas Used

LoC

High

Medium

Low

Storage

2563829

130

2

6

4

Clearance

1139844

55

1

4

4

Settlement

1899021

87

4

3

1

Storage

2298763

108

2

4

4

Settlement

1803294

75

0

4

2

Storage

2298763

110

2

5

3

Clearance

1089324

50

0

2

3

Settlement

1822324

85

2

3

3

Storage

2091723

108

1

4

3

Clearance

1002319

50

1

2

2

Settlement

1317324

85

2

5

3

FactoryContract

Storage

2298763

120

1

5

3

AccessRestriction

Storage

2602218

135

0

5

4

Flyweight

Settlement

1903391

95

2

4

2

ReverseVerifier

Clearance

1092131

69

3

2

2

No Pattern

Oracle

ContractRegistry

ProxyContract

When the analysis was performed using Smartcheck, we obtained results similar to Slither, both for contracts that employ patterns and contracts without them.
Smartcheck also identified more issues compared to Slither, in all types of contracts.
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Table 6.2.3: ChequeChain Securify Analysis
Pattern

Contract

Gas Used

LoC

High

Medium

Low

Storage

2563829

130

5

7

6

Clearance

1139844

55

3

4

3

Settlement

1899021

87

6

2

2

Storage

2298763

108

3

5

6

Settlement

1803294

75

3

3

1

Storage

2298763

110

4

3

5

Clearance

1089324

50

3

2

3

Settlement

1822324

85

3

3

3

Storage

2091723

108

4

4

4

Clearance

1002319

50

2

2

1

Settlement

1317324

85

4

5

2

FactoryContract

Storage

2298763

120

4

3

3

AccessRestriction

Storage

2602218

135

3

5

3

Flyweight

Settlement

1903391

95

4

3

1

ReverseVerifier

Clearance

1092131

69

2

6

2

No Pattern

Oracle

ContractRegistry

ProxyContract

Securify managed to identify even more issues than Slither and Smartcheck. However, it also identified a large number of medium and low risk issues even in contracts
that employed design patterns. Although, the number of high risk issues were considerably lower.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future Work
In this research, we proposed a two-step approach to determine the prevalence and
usage of design patterns in blockchain-based applications, and to measure their impact
on software quality.
Our first step involved performing pattern detection, gas consumption analysis,
and static analysis on smart contracts currently available on the main Ethereum
blockchain. We built a new design pattern detection tool based on regular expressions and checked contracts for presence of patterns. Based on the results obtained
from performing Step 1, we noted significantly lower number of insecure/low quality
contracts when design patterns were employed. We also noted that the number of
design patterns also had an impact on the absence of high risk vulnerabilities in patterns that employed more than one design pattern. The static analysis was performed
using three different tools, and we observed similar results on all of them.
In the second step, we built our own blockchain-based application. First, we identified business requirements that would require smart contracts. Then we determined
design patterns that could be employed to achieve these business requirements. We
then performed gas consumption, LoC, and static analysis on smart contracts we
wrote to achieve the above business requirements and measured the difference in
high, medium, and low risk issues. On all three static analysis tools used, we noticed
a lower number of high risk issues, but the number of medium and low risk issues
remained the same.
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7.1

Future Work

At the time of writing this thesis, it was the first work of research to attempt an empirical analysis of design pattern usage and measurement of their impact on software
quality, in a blockchain-based application development perspective. Future research
on this topic can employ a design pattern detection system used in traditional software such AST parsing. Our research is also limited to only measuring the impact
of design patterns on software quality. Their impact on performance can also be
measured.
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